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Abstract
Many scholars have found both Wittgenstein’s suggestion 
in para. 608 of Zettel (hereafter Z608) that language and 
thought may arise out of chaos at the centre and his remark 
to his friend Drury that he looks at philosophical problems 
from a religious point of view to be most puzzling. The 
paper argues that the language in Z608 illustrates his point 
in his remark to Drury. For the language of the emergence 
of meaning from chaos at the true centre is the religious 
language of creation found in Goethe and Milton—both 
of whom were much admired by Wittgenstein. The paper 
refutes the orthodox interpretations that Z608 suggests 
that language and thought may arise out of chaos at the 
neural centre. The “religious-cosmological” interpretation 
of Z608 is sketched. It is shown that the language of Z608 
is found in Goethe’s Faust and in Milton’s Paradise Lost. 
On this basis a, roughly, phenomenological” reading of 
Z608 is developed. Finally, it is argued that this literary-
religious reading of the language in Z608 expresses 
Wittgenstein’s view that humanity lives, so to speak, in 
a fallen state, and that, therefore, human language and 
human philosophizing are limited by humanity’s fallen 
(from paradise) state—or, as Wittgenstein puts it in the 
religious language in the Preface to his Philosophical 
Investigations, that humanity is currently limited by the 
“poverty and darkness of our time.” 
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INTRODUCTION
No supposition seems to me more natural than that there is no 
process in the brain correlated with associating or with thinking; 
so that it would be impossible to read off thought processes from 
brainprocesses. I mean this: if I talk or write, there is, I assume, 
a system of impulses going out from my brain and correlated 
with my spoken or written thoughts. But why should the system 
continue further in the direction of the centre? Why should this 
order not proceed, so to speak, out of chaos? The case would be 
like the following – certain kinds of plants multiply by seed, so 
that a seed always produces a plant of the same kind as that from 
which it was produced – but nothing in the seed corresponds to 
the plant which comes out of it – this can only be done from the 
history of the seed. So an organism might come into being out of 
something quite amorphous, as it were, causelessly; and there is 
no reason why this should not really hold for our thoughts, and 
hence for our talking and writing. 
Wittgenstein, Zettel (para. 608)
Wittgenstein is the philosopher of poets and composers, 
playwrights and novelists, …
Jarman, Wittgenstein: The Terry Eagleton Script (p.5)
According to the orthodox interpretations paragraph 
608 of Wittgenstein’s Zettel (hereafter Z608) suggests 
that language might arise out of physical chaos in the 
brain. McGinn (1984, pp.12–13, pp.112–114) thinks it 
suggests that the heads of normal thinking human beings 
might be filled with sawdust. Ben-Yami (2005) thinks 
Z608 envisages the conceptual possibility that human 
brains might turn out to be in physical chaos. Scheer 
(1991) thinks it posits causal indeterminism in the brain. 
Davies (1991) and Mills (1993) separately suggest that 
it anticipates connectionist theories of neural processing 
(See also Sutton, 2014). Hark (1995) argues that Z608 
can only be a critique of Köhler’s theory of electric brain-
fields. All claim that the centre and chaos in Z608 as the 
neural centre and neural chaos. On this view (hereafter 
the Neurological Interpretation or NI), Z608 suggests 
that language and thought may arise out of physical 
chaos at the neural centre—but this cannot be correct. 
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Wittgenstein’s “later philosophy” (hereafter WLP), to 
which Z608 belongs,1 stresses that the philosopher must 
not advance any kind of theories or theses (PI, 109, 128; 
Z, 233). Despite this, NI sees Z608, not only as advancing 
theories and theses but some quite extreme ones at 
this. NI is s most implausible reading of a passage in 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy (hereafter Wittgenstein).
 There is, however, a different way to read Z608. Since 
WLP stresses that “everything lies open to view” (PI, 89, 
126, 435),2 it must be possible to interpret the key concepts 
in Z608, chaos, the centre, the “arising” of order, etc., as 
referring to items that lie open to view. On this reading, 
Z608 does not suggest that linguistic meaning (hereafter 
meaningL) and mental content (contentM) may “arise” 
from physical “chaos” at the neural “centre” but that these 
may “arise,” in a very different non-causal sense, from a 
kind of “chaos” that “lies open to view” at a kind of centre 
that is open to view—namely “chaotic” behaviour at the 
centre of “forms of [human] life”. On this reading, rather 
than suggesting most un-Wittgensteinian theories about 
hidden processes in the brain, Z608 is actually nothing 
other than a vivid portrait of WittgensteinL’s perspective—
according to which meaningL “arises,” so to speak, from 
the “infinite variations” (CV, 73) in human forms of life.
 In his (2013), (2014a) and (2014c) McDonough, 
invoking WittgensteinL’s remark to Drury that he cannot 
help looking at philosophical problems from a religious 
point of view (Malcolm, 1997, 1), argues that Z608 
is not written in the language of neuroscience but in 
the language of religious-cosmogony (hereafter RCI). 
McDonough (2014b) argues that Z608 also admits of an 
Austrian economic interpretation (AEI).3 Since, however, 
WittgensteinL emphasizes the connection of meaningL and 
contentM with forms of human life, and since literature 
is the natural vehicle for a portrait of forms of life, 
WittgensteinL’s views are also well-suited to a literary 
interpretation. The present paper supplements RCI and 
AEI with a literary interpretation (hereafter LI) of the 
key terms in Z608 by considering similar language (the 
arising of meaning from chaos at the spiritual centre) 
in two literary figures revered by Wittgenstein: Goethe 
and Milton. It is further argued that LI is not merely of 
academic interest but sheds new light, not only on Z608 
but on WittgensteinL’s views generally. 
 § I argues that NI contradicts Wittgenstein’s signature 
views. § II briefly sketches RCI. § III shows that Z608’s 
picture of order arising from chaos by movement towards 
the true centre is found in Goethe. § IV shows that a 
similar picture is found in Milton’s Paradise Lost. § V 
argues that LI discloses a “phenomenological” dimension 
to Z608 (a portrait of the emergence of language from 
forms of life that is “open to view”). § VI sketches 
the more humble conception of philosophy shared by 
Wittgenstein and Milton that emerges from LI.
1. THE NEUROLOGICAL MODEL OF 
ZETTEL 608
Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither 
explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to 
view there is nothing to explain. 
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (para.126)
Only conceptual and aesthetic questions … grip me. At bottom I 
am indifferent to the solution of scientific problems; …
Wittgenstein, Culture and Value (p.79) 
Despite the fact that Wittgenstein rejects the relevance 
of scientific theories about hidden processes to the 
solution to his philosophical issues, NI reads Z608 as 
proposing just such theories. Since, however, Wittgenstein 
holds that “everything lies open to view” what one should 
infer that the centre and chaos mentioned in Z608 do not 
refer to hidden neural processes but to something that is 
already “open to view”.
Whereas NI assumes the centre mentioned in Z608 
is the neural centre, that is the real point of Z608, read 
carefully, is that it is not the neural centre. Consider the 
2nd-4th sentences in Z608 (numbered for convenience):
 (S1) [I]f I talk or write, there is, I assume, a system of impulses 
going out from my brain and correlated with my spoken or 
written thoughts. (S2) But why should the system continue 
further in the direction of the centre? (S3) Why should this order 
not proceed, so to speak [sozusagen], out of chaos?
Whereas NI assumes that centre mentioned in S2 
must be the neural centre, S1 endorses the common view 
that the brain impulses cause human behaviour. But S1 
indicates that those neural impulses move from the brain 
towards spoken/written items in the public world. Since S2, 
read naturally, asks why that neural system should proceed 
further in that direction, the centre mentioned in S2 has to 
be in the public world that is “open to view”.
Wittgenstein identifies this public centre at several 
other places in WLP. In PI (108), he contrasts his old 
TLP-view of language possesses a kind of “formal unity” 
with his new view that “the axis of reference of our 
examination must be rotated … around the fixed point 
[Angelpunkt] of our real need”—which he identifies 
with ordinary life. But “Angelpunkt,” which Anscombe 
translates as “fixed point,” can be translated as centre-
point (Traupman, 1991, 17). Thus, PI (108) identifies the 
real centre-point of “our examination” as ordinary life—
or, more precisely, “forms of life” (PI, 23, pp.174, 226). 
Similarly, RFM (III.15) identifies “the centre of gravity 
of mathematics” as action and LFM (246) identifies 
the “central reality” corresponding to mathematical 
propositions, not as abstract objects, but as our methods 
of representing. These kinds of centres of human activities 
are, unlike the neural centre, “open to view.” Wittgenstein 
never identifies the centre of a language with the neural 
centre—but that is the reading adopted by NI.
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Second, since the notion of chaos in Z608 is tied to the 
notion of the centre, this clarifies Z608’s notion of chaos 
as well. NI correctly assumes that the chaos is where the 
centre is, but since it misidentifies the location of the 
centre, it misidentifies the location of the chaos. In fact, 
Wittgenstein employs chaos-imagery throughout WLP. At 
OC (613-614) he states that the attempt to doubt certain 
very fundamental things … would plunge human judgment 
into “chaos”—referring not to chaos in the brain but to 
a kind of “chaos” in human life. He also alludes to the 
chaos from which language arises when he identifies “the 
great swarm [ganze Gewimmel] of human actions” against 
which action is judged (Z567). Since understanding the 
way language arises from the great “swarm” of human 
action is what the philosopher needs to understand, 
Wittgenstein states at CV (65) that the philosopher 
must learn to “feel at home” in “primeval chaos.” Thus, 
whereas some philosophers may prefer to reside in the 
more comforting artificial worlds of Wittgenstein’s own 
TLP or Russell’s Principles of Mathematics the correct 
understanding of language requires that one descend into 
the chaotic ganze Gewimmel of human life in order to see 
how language “arises” from it. The description of the way 
language arises out of chaos of life is found on virtually 
every page of WLP. It is what is behind Wittgenstein’s 
remark that there are “countless kinds of sentences that 
are constantly coming into and dropping out of existence 
(PI, 23). It is what is behind his remarks that many words 
do not have fixed meanings and that one cannot give a 
complete list of rules for the use of a word but that this 
does not detract from their utility (PI, 79; Z440-441). It 
is what is behind his remark that “in the flux of life” rigid 
concepts won’t do and that all concepts are “elastic” (LW-
1, 246, 340). It is what is behind his remark that “life’s 
infinite variations are essential to our life” (CV, 73). It is 
what is behind his remark that that “what we regard as 
expression consists in incalculability” (CV, 73).4 It is such 
points to which Z608 refers when it suggests that language 
may “sozusagen” arise from chaos. That is, Z608 is, quite 
obviously, not concerned with the neural basis of language 
but with the elusive connection between languages and 
“chaotic” forms of life. 
 In summary, Z608 does not suggest that language 
arises from chaos at the neural centre. It suggests that 
language arises from the chaotic ganze Gewimmel of 
human behaviour in the true centre (“Angelpunkt” of our 
real need”) of language—the open world of human action. 
In effect, Z608 proposes a “Copernican Revolution” in 
the understanding of language to replace to old view that 
language is centred in hidden neural mechanisms with 
the new view that it is centred in forms of life that are 
“open to view” (McDonough, 1989, 18-21). Thus, Z608 
supports a phenomenological picture of the way language 
arises from the chaotic Ganze Gewimmel at the centre of 
human forms of life. It is in this sense in the tradition of 
German “life-philosophy” (Rickman, 1988, 91-2, 148-9, 
etc.). Despite this, most scholars have assumed their own 
scientific paradigms in reading Z608. 
2. THE RELIGIOUS-COSMOLOGICAL 
INTERPRETATION OF ZETTEL 608 
Wittgenstein [told] his … friend Drury: … “I am not a religious 
man but I cannot help seeing every problem from a religious 
point of view.” … [This] made Drury wonder whether “there 
are not dimensions to Wittgenstein’s thought that are still largely 
being ignored” ... I have the same doubt in regard to myself. 
Malcolm, Wittgenstein: From a Religious Point of View? (p.1)
What I invent are new similes. 
Wittgenstein, Culture and Value (p.19)
Whereas NI sees the centre and chaos in Z608 as 
the neural centre and neural chaos, RCI, following 
Wittgenstein’s remark to Drury (hereafter WRD), holds 
that the language in Z608 is the language of creation that 
originated in Hesiod’s Theogony (McDonough, 2013). 
Although Malcolm (1997, p.92) and Winch (1997, p.132) 
admit uncertainty how to interpret WRD, there are 
numerous religious images in Wittgenstein’s writings. 
In TLP and NB Wittgenstein endorses the microcosmic 
doctrine found in numerous religious writers, including 
Wittgenstein’s “revered” Augustine (Malcolm, 2001, 
59), but also in Milton and Goethe. In the Preface to PI 
Wittgenstein refers to “the poverty and darkness of our 
time”, which follows Augustine’s view of man’s temporal 
life as poverty and darkness (Chadwick, 2001, 21, 33, 
120, etc.). At OC (370), in language reminiscent of 
Pascal (2005, 37, 45, 59, 62), Wittgenstein remarks that 
if one doubts certain fundamental things, one “stand[s] 
before the abyss [Nichts].” At RFM (V.13) Wittgenstein 
states that mathematics relies on a “good angel” and at 
other places he worries about a “demon” that may play 
havoc in mathematics (RFM I, 45, 135; II, 78; PI, 339; 
OC, 639). He repeatedly appeals to the notion of God’s 
eye perspective and God’s creative power (PI 452, 426, 
pp.217, 226; RFM, I. 72; III, 56; V, 27, 29, 34; LFM, 
103–104, 131, 147; LW-2, 85; etc.). The image of the seed 
from Z608 is common in religious writings as a metaphor 
for growth (Zechariah 8: 12) or as a spiritual metaphor 
as in the parable of the mustard seed (Matthew 13:31–32; 
Mark 4: 30-32). The imagery of chaos and movement 
towards the centre from Z608 is found in many religious 
writers including Augustine (Clark 2005, 54, 66; Clark, 
2001, 94; Brunn, 1988, 23, 109; etc.). The present section 
concentrates on the creation imagery from Z608, but, as 
shown later, this imagery links up with Wittgenstein’s 
imagery of the centre, chaos, darkness, etc.
RCI does not hold that Z608 endorses any religious 
views. Z608 only states that the production of language 
is “sozusgen” like the emergence of order from chaos. 
Wittgenstein is only making comparisons that he finds 
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illuminating (PI, 130-131; RFM V.12; CV, 19, etc.). 
Whereas indeterminism, connectionism, sawdust in the 
head, etc., are theories about inner states or processes, 
Z608 no more states a theory than Wittgenstein states a 
theory when he compares language to a labyrinth at PI 
(203). When Wittgenstein, in WRD, states that he looks 
at philosophical problems from a religious point of view 
he only means that he employs religious similes to shed 
light on philosophical problems. The language in Z608 is 
not the language of armchair neuroscience. It is, broadly 
speaking, literary language—the “mythological” language 
of a “kind of world picture” (OC, 95).
Second, whereas NI holds that the centre in Z608 is 
the neural centre, Z608, read carefully, implies that the 
neural impulses are moving from the brain towards a 
centre (“Angelpunkt”) in the public world of spoken or 
written sentences. But this parallels the language in many 
religious myths in which one moves towards a spiritual 
centre as towards a goal in order to achieve salvation, 
enlightenment, etc. (McDonough, 2013 & 2014).
Third, whereas NI sees the chaos in Z608 as neural 
chaos, Z608, read carefully, implies that the chaos is not 
in the brain but in the shared public centre of language. 
Thus, what Z608 really suggests is that language arises, 
“sozusagen,” out of the “chaotic” Ganze Gewimmel 
of human behaviour in the centre of “ordinary life.” 
Wittgenstein employs this creation imagery in Z608 in 
order to suggest an alternative to the orthodox neural 
paradigm. On his new paradigm, the production of 
language is not like a mechanical process, but is more like 
the creation of a cosmos from chaos as described in many 
great literary works.5
3. THE ARISING OF ORDER FROM 
CHAOS IN FAUST
Our thought … marches with certain views of Goethe’s [in 
his] Metamorphosis of Plants. … We are collating one form 
of language with its environment, or transforming it in the 
imagination so as to gain a view of the whole of space in which 
the structure of our language has its being.
 Wittgenstein and Waisman, Logik, Sprache, Philosophie6
 God grant the philosopher insight into what lies in front of 
everyone’s eyes.
Wittgenstein, Culture and Value (p.63)
It is well-known that both Wittgenstein (Malcolm, 
1977; McDonough, 1989) and Goethe (McDonough, 
2004) reject mechanistic theories of living things and, 
accordingly, mechanistic accounts of language production. 
This is rooted in their shared vision of creative nature 
(McDonough, 2004). The present section examines the 
similarity between Goethe’s creation imagery (Moretti, 
1998, p.631; Brown, 1998, pp.688, 692; etc.) and 
Wittgenstein’s remarks at Z602-Z615. 
First, the microcosmic idea from Wittgenstein’s early 
philosophy is found in Faust (hereafter FAU). Lines 
such as: “Root up earth’s core with urgent divination. 
Feel in one’s breast six days-worth of creation” (FAU, 
91), suggests the view, central to the present reading of 
Z608, that the language of cosmic creation also applies, 
sozusagen, to man—the microcosm (Bennett, 1998, p.600; 
Moretti, 1998, p.628). 
Second, the image of “the centre” from Z608 also 
plays a crucial role in FAU. Steiner (1924, § 9) identifies a 
key feature of Goethe’s notion of the centre,
There is absolutely only one single thought-content, and our 
individual thinking is nothing more than our self … working its 
way into the thought-centre of the world.
This is reflected in Faust’s attempt to reach the centre 
of the universe by making a deal with the devil (Fuller, 
1998, 565). Pace Z608, properly read, the motion is 
towards the centre, as towards a goal, not, as NI sees 
it, from a (neural) centre that is the efficient cause of 
the neural impulses. Goethe employs the idea that one 
achieves knowledge by moving towards the “single 
thought content” at the spiritual centre of the world. 
Why, however, is finding the true centre so hard to do? 
If there is a single thought centre of the world then there 
is no alternative. So why is it not automatic that one’s 
thought-content reflects this single thought-centre? FAU’s 
answer is that human life is a constant battle between 
the forces of order and chaos, where the order in human 
life, as in the cosmos, arises, not out of reason, but out of 
chaos, darkness, instinct, etc. (Mellett, 2001).
Mephistopheles (the Devil) exclaims, 
I am a part … of the Darkness, Darkness 
that gave birth to Light. The proud Light 
that now competes with mother Night 
concerning her more ancient rank and 
place.7
To Mephistopheles’ proud claim Faust replies: “You 
marvelous son of chaos!” (Mellett 2001, Introduction), 
thereby endorsing the view that chaos and darkness give 
birth to light.
Faust envisages a dynamic relation between chaos and 
the centre. Given Goethe’s own microcosmic doctrine 
(Moretti, 1998, p.600, p.628), this is reflected in a struggle 
between the cosmic forces of chaos and one’s own nisus 
towards the true centre (Steiner, 2000, p.5). Although 
one’s own true centre is the same with the thought-centre 
of the world, human beings often get distracted in the 
chaos and darkness and abandon quest for the true centre.
 Goethe also sees chaos as an essential force in human 
evolution towards the higher spiritual levels. Taking some 
poetic license (with his insertion of the parenthetical 
remark), Mellett translates the last four lines of Part II of 
Faust, sung by the Mystical Chorus, thus,
 Everything past is but a metaphor! 
 What cannot be calculated is happening right here! 
What cannot be described is being accomplished right here! 
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The Eternal Feminine (Mother Chaos, Mother Night) evolves us 
ever more and ever more.
Since human evolution is an outcome of the struggle 
between the forces of chaos and one’s own nisus towards 
the single cosmic thought-centre, the course of evolution 
cannot be calculated or even described—which means it 
can only be captured in metaphor. For similar reasons, 
Wittgenstein in Z608 indicates that his language is 
metaphorical (“sozusagen”). Finally, Wittgenstein’s 
remarks in Z603-604 about the unpredictability of human 
behaviour correspond to Goethe’s remark that what is 
happening “right here” cannot be calculated.
In summary, key elements from Z602-614 are reflected 
in Goethe’s Faust. First, both agree that the key elements 
in genesis cannot be described literally—they are, 
borrowing Wittgenstein’s words from TLP (Preface)—
“beyond the limits of language” and can only be expressed 
metaphorically. Second, the order in human life arises out 
of chaos/darkness. Third, the arising of order from chaos 
requires motion towards the true centre. Fourth, because 
the arising of order from chaos is beyond the limits of 
language it is incalculable. Fifth, the imagery in FAU has 
nothing to do with scientific theories about brain-function, 
but, rather, is concerned with spiritual development 
in human life. As literature, Faust is concerned with 
something that takes place right before one’s eyes (in 
the lives of the characters in the story). It is for similar 
reasons that Wittgenstein insists that “what is hidden” 
(in the brain) “is of no interest” to his philosophical 
investigations (PI, 126). 
4. THE ARISING OF ORDER FROM 
CHAOS IN PARADISE LOST
It takes the authority of a Milton to convince me. 
Wittgenstein, Culture and Value (p.48)
This subversive impulse in Milton’s spirit—we may call it the 
recognition of human production of everything humans can 
value, including the concept of creation—is also the spirit of [his] 
age, …, the continual restless struggling forth of the new.
 Teskey, Delirious Milton (p.18)
Since Milton’s Paradise Lost (hereafter PL) contains 
some of the most sublime religious language ever written, 
and since Milton blended his poetry with his philosophy 
(Fallon, 2007), and since, like Wittgenstein, Milton was 
heavily influenced by Augustine (Lewis, 1961, Ch. X), 
and since Wittgenstein revered Milton as an authority, 
it is only reasonable, following WRD, to ask whether 
Milton’s imagery sheds some light on Wittgenstein’s 
views. It would at first glance not seem that there is not 
much likelihood of success. Milton, like Goethe, shares 
Wittgenstein’s distaste for mechanistic accounts of living 
things (Rogers, 1996, p.12, pp.217-218), but this only 
supports a highly general comparison. Further, Milton 
begins PL (I: 22-26) by calling upon God to illumine 
what is “dark” in him and to “raise” what is “low” in 
him, so that he might “justify the ways of God to men”. 
When Milton refers to “the ways of God” he is referring, 
among other things, to the fall of man, the entry of sin 
and death into the world, the ejection of Adam and Eve 
from Eden, etc. Thus, to “justify the ways of God to men” 
requires explaining how a perfect God can let such things 
happen—roughly, “the problem of evil” (Mackie, 1971; 
Patterson, 2008). But what can such theological matters 
have to do with Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language? 
Consider Wittgenstein’s imagery in Z608! The image 
of seeds appears early in PL: “That shepherd who first 
taught the chosen seed …” (I: 8). The two main images in 
Z608, motion towards the centre and order arising from 
chaos8 appear repeatedly in PL. Indeed, what “the chosen 
seed” (I: 8) was taught was “how the heavens and earth 
arose out of chaos” (I: 9-10). 
The key notion of the centre is introduced a few lines 
later. Referring to the rebellious angels cast into hell, 
Milton (I: 71-74) writes,
 For those rebellious, here their prison ordained
 In utter darkness, and their portion set,
 As far removed from God and the light of heaven
 As from the centre thrice to the utmost pole
God and the divine light are located at the centre while 
the rebellious angels are removed from the true centre 
to a distant dark place. Although they have moved from 
the divine centre, the point is that the proper motion is 
towards the (divine) centre. Even in the first pages of PL, 
one finds the image of order from chaos via movement 
towards the true centre. Note, by the way, that in “The 
Argument” to Book I (Le Comte, 35), Milton assimilates 
darkness and chaos when he describes hell as “a place of 
utter darkness, fitliest called Chaos”.9 Thus, the darkness 
imagery in Milton links with the chaos and darkness 
imagery in WLP. This imagery is also combined with the 
microcosmic idea, at IX: 107-113,10
As God in 
Heaven is centre, yet extends to all, so thou
Centring, receiv’st from all those orbs; in thee
Not in themselves, all their known virtue appears,
…
Of growth, sense, reason, all summed up in Man.
Note, first, that though God is identified as the centre 
of “all”, there is a second quite different notion of the 
centre in the passage expressed by a verb: “Centring” 
is something that man, by doing, receives virtues from 
all the other creatures that, sozusagen, orbit around him. 
Since God is the absolute centre by virtue of His essence, 
He does not need to do any “centring,” but man, as 
microcosm, can mirror God (to the degree appropriate 
to his lesser nature) by centring himself on God. Of 
course, man might fail to do this, but, in that case, like the 
rebellious angels, he moves from the true centre towards 
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chaos and darkness.
 Second, the passage implies that just as God “extends 
to all” of existence so man extends to all the other 
creatures. The “virtues” of these lesser creatures, growth, 
sense, and reason, are “summed up” in man. Just as man 
is a microcosm of God’s created cosmos, the various 
creatures are microcosms of man, yielding a hierarchy 
of living things, akin to Lovejoy’s (1964, 89, 164) Great 
Chain of Being, in which the lower creatures are images 
of man (i.e., revolve, sozusagen, around man at the centre 
of the material world), who, in turn, is an image of God’s 
created cosmos (i.e., revolves, sozusagen, around the 
Divine centre of the cosmos). 
 The image of order arising from chaos via motion 
towards the centre conjoined in Z608 is also conjoined in 
Milton’s description of God’s creative act (VII: 225-231, 
242), 
He took, the golden compass, prepared 
In God’s eternal store, to circumscribe 
This universe, and all created things.
One foot he centred and the other turned
…
And said, …
This be thy just circumference, O World.”
…
And earth, self-balanced, on her centre hung.
God here takes the “golden compass,” plants one foot 
in the centre of creation, and turns the other foot to set it 
in circular motion—thereby determining the limits (“just 
circumference”) of the created world. That is, God moves 
his foot towards the material centre to create an earth 
“balanced” on her centre. It seems that Milton’s God, like 
Wittgenstein, employs a compass to fix the “Angelpunkt” 
of his real need. For Milton’s God, this is the centre of 
the created cosmos. For Wittgenstein, it is the Angelpunkt 
of language that he, in his philosophical investigations, 
wishes to understand. 
One of Milton’s images of chaos is particularly 
illuminating in the present connection. Recall that 
Wittgenstein sees language arising from the Ganze 
Gewimmel (great swarm) of human behaviour. Milton 
also, like Goethe, uses swarm-imagery. Sometimes, as 
at PL (VII: 385-402, 489-492), he uses it as an organic 
metaphor associated with the generation of life,
And God said, “Let the waters generate 
…
With fry innumerable swarm, …
and
Swarming next appeared
The female bee, that feeds her husband drone
At II: 890-903 Milton suggests a connection between 
the genesis of living organisms and primal chaos (Rumrich, 
1996, pp.23, 101, 130-132, 141-142),
 Before their eyes in sudden view appear
 The secrets of the hoary deep, …
 …
 where eldest night
 And chaos, ancestors of nature, hold
 Eternal anarchy, …
 …
 Of each faction, in their several clans, 
 Swarm populous, unnumbered as the sands … 
 At X: 521-522 he employs swarm imagery to refer to 
the pit of devils changed into serpents,
  [D]readful was the din
 Of hissing throughout the hall, thick swarming now
 
At XII: 185-188 he refers to
 A darksome cloud of locusts swarming down
 Must eat, and on the ground leave nothing green;
 Darkness must overshadow all his bounds
Milton here combines the organic image (swarming 
insects) with the spiritual darkness that exceeds its proper 
bounds. That is, Milton too has his ganze Gewimmel 
(great swarm) of living things, sometimes as an image of 
organic generation, sometimes of creative primal chaos, 
sometimes of Satan’s swarming hoards—sometimes as a 
combination of these. Thus, Milton too sees order arising 
out of the chaotic Ganze Gewimmel of living things.
Finally there is a less obvious image of order arising 
from chaos in PL that turns out to be very illuminating for 
WLP. It is a major theme in PL that sin comes into the 
world by virtue of female transgression. Eve’s reply to 
Adam’s accusation at IX: 1144-1146 is significant,
 What words have passed thy lips, Adam severe,
 Imput’st thou that to my default, or will
 Of wandering, as thou call’st it, …
Sin comes into the world via Eve’s will to wander, 
where wandering is aimless chaotic movement without 
definite purpose or direction.11 Milton here invokes the 
common identification of chaos with the feminine (Dalley, 
1987, 329; Rumrich, 1996, 138-145). It was because Eve 
wandered out of Adam’s control that sin and death entered 
the world. 
This especially significant since the same word is used 
to describe the “sons of Belial, flown with insolence and 
wine,” who, inspired by Satan, “wander forth” into the 
night to commit lawless acts in “the streets of Sodom” 
(I: 502-505). Although the naked sexism is disturbing, it 
soon emerges that that Eve’s chaotic wandering ways are 
an essential part of “the ways of God” that Milton sets out 
to justify in PL.12 
Consider in this connection the famous cryptic final 
words of PL (XII: 641-642) in which Adam and Eve, 
having been expelled from Paradise, look back sadly at 
their former home, 
 Some natural tears they dropped, but wiped them soon;
 The world was all before them, where to choose
 Their place of rest, and Providence their guide;
 They, hand in hand, with wandering steps and slow,
7 Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
Richard McDonough (2015). 
Studies in Literature and Language, 10(4), 1-14
 Though Eden took their solitary way
It appears that Adam, as he now wanders with Eve, has 
been converted to her wandering ways. Could it be that 
chaotic wandering is part of God’s plan? 
In fact, from the beginning, all was not what it seemed 
in paradise. Eden was, no doubt, beautiful. In a passage 
that becomes important later, Milton (IV: 236-241) even 
doubts that “art” is equal to the task of describing its 
beauty,
 [I]f Art could tell
 How, from that sapphire fount the crispèd brooks,
 Rolling on orient pearl and sands of gold,
 With mazy error under pendant shades,
 Ran nectar, visiting each plant, and fed
 Flowers worthy of Paradise, …
Unfortunately, something was missing from paradise—
namely, freedom. But in order to achieve freedom, one 
needs knowledge. Thus, Eve’s her chaotic wandering that 
led her to eat from the tree of knowledge of good and evil 
was a necessary part of God’s plan (Shoaf, 1985, 27-28). 
Thus, part of the story in PL is that Eve’s sin first brought 
sin and death into the world, but the other part, is that 
by so doing she liberated Adam, and by implication, all 
mankind, from the tyranny (I: 124) of childlike obedience. 
For chaos is not simple evil. It is also “the womb of 
nature” (II: 910)—the creative principle (Norton, 1999, 
232, 241-242). As such, it is also the source of liberty (Cf. 
Rogers, 9-10, 114, etc.).13 Adam concludes, near the end of 
the poem, that “to obey is best” (XII: 561), but this means 
an obedience freely given, earned in the struggle through 
the chaos of life (Himes, 2005, 318 n108, 347-348 n959). 
This is why PL ends with Adam and Eve, setting off freely 
(“where to choose”) to explore the new world (since 
their old home lay behind them) that lay before them, 
guided only by Providence. The concluding worlds of PL 
describe the beginning of a journey through the chaos and 
darkness—but it is important to be clear what providence 
means here.
In the Christian tradition Providence is God’s power of 
providing for human needs: “The Lord will provide” (Gen. 
22: 14). But Providence does not provide any guarantee 
of success. Nor does it provide a map for one’s journey. 
Belief in Providence is belief that one is in God’s hands. 
If one wants to become the Bishop and fails to get it, the 
Christian says, “God will provide”, meaning that one was 
not meant to get it after all because God had other plans 
for one’s life. Providence does not provide any escape 
from the chaos and darkness of life.
On the contrary, the whole point is to learn to live in 
the chaos and darkness in order to build a new order in it. 
By the end of the poem Adam has learned “to walk” (XII: 
562-568) 
 As in his presence, ever to observe
 His providence, and on him sole depend,
 Merciful over all his works, with good
 Still overcoming evil, and by small
 Accomplishing great things, …
The chaos and darkness, the “mazy error,” remain 
around Adam and Eve, but now, properly centred in 
God, they are equipped with the “spiritual armor” (XII: 
491) to fight it.14 Nor are these “great things” they might 
accomplish just anything. Adam and Eve were not put on 
earth to become great finger-painters. The angel explains 
God’s plan that out of the chaos will arise a “Paradise … 
far happier … Than this of Eden” (XII: 463-465). Adam 
replies (XII: 469-473),
 O goodness infinite, goodness immense,
 That all this good of evil shall produce,
 And evil turn to good, more wonderful
 Than that by which creation first brought forth
 Light out of darkness!
Given that the image of light arising from darkness is 
a variant on that of order arising from chaos,15 the passage 
gives Milton’s justification of “the ways of God to man.” 
Eve’s sin, the fall of man, the ages of suffering, etc., are 
justified because these are necessary to produce an even 
greater goodness—one not imposed by divine tyranny, 
but self-won by free human beings as they struggle to 
build a better order in the chaos of their fallen life. God’s 
plan was not that human beings should revel forever like 
innocent children in the dazzling beauty of Eden. It was 
that human beings should learn, in the painful journey 
through the chaos, freely to bring good out of evil and 
order out of chaos. In Wittgenstein’s words, this requires 
that the philosopher must “descend into the primeval 
chaos and feel at home there” (CV, 65). Wittgenstein here 
describes nothing less than the necessity of the fall of man 
into the primeval chaos where he must make his home—
but that is the story of PL.
In fact, the chaos was already present, but unseen, in 
Eden. Recall from IV: 236-241 how in Eden “nectar” ran 
“with mazy error” feeding “Flowers worthy of Paradise”. 
Since a maze symbolizes chaos (McCullough, 2005, 4, 
220) the passage implies that even the flowers of paradise, 
prior to the fall, arise from chaos. Similarly, at IV: 232-
234, Milton describes a great river in Eden fed by the 
“nether flood,” which
… from his darksome passage now appears, and now, divided 
into four main streams, runs diverse, wandering many a famous 
realm, …
Even in Eden before the fall, order (a system of life-
giving rivers) emerges from the darkness and (chaotically) 
“wanders” through many realms. But Adam and Eve 
had failed to see the chaos and darkness that had been 
right before their eyes all the time. Indeed, Eve’s chaotic 
wandering was just an extension of the chaos around 
them. Since Adam shares this same nature (she was made 
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from his rib), his critique of her wandering was a great 
failure of self-knowledge.16 The fault that Adam saw in 
Eve exists and must exist in himself as well. Thus, PL 
describes a fall that necessitates a journey in which, to use 
Wittgenstein’s words, Adam and Eve come to see “what 
lies in front of everyone’s eyes” (See epigraph, § III.)
One crucial part of what they must come to realize 
after the fall is that even their language is fallen (Carrithers 
and Hardy, 1994).17 It is not as if their language has 
somehow miraculously escaped the fall. Even their 
language is now infected with the “mazy error” that 
pervades their fallen life. Had their language escaped 
the fall, they could, at least, retire to that secure corner 
of their life and rationally plan their journey through the 
darkness. But since their language is infected with that 
same darkness (Shoaf, 36-37, 96-97), the notion of a true 
proposition is of limited utility to them. Since even their 
“propositions” are infected with that “mazy error”, the 
sort of truth available to fallen beings, who, sozusagen, 
see everything “through a glass darkly” (Cor. 13:12), is, 
as Heidegger stresses (Guignon, 2001, 52), disclosedness 
(bringing light to the darkness).18 
Thus, what Adam and Eve possess at the end of the 
poem is not some divine gift of happiness. The chaos 
and darkness remain around them and inside them. 
Happiness and goodness do not, sozusagen, “fall from 
heaven”.19 But now they are equipped with the “spiritual 
armor” (XII: 491) to fight it. It is part of God’s plan 
that happiness and goodness must be won by free self-
knowing (VII: 509-513) beings, in a journey that brings 
light to the chaos/darkness around them. They are also 
equipped with the realization that they can only succeed 
by centreing themselves in God. It is inevitable, therefore, 
that, at the end of the poem, Adam and Eve set out with 
“wandering steps”. For they have discovered that, like 
Mephistopheles, they too are sons (and daughters) of 
chaos—and that this is the way it must be! It is God’s 
plan that human beings must freely build a better order 
and they can only do this by making order arise from the 
chaos/darkness that surrounds and penetrates them.
5. THE LITERARY MODEL OF ZETTEL 
608
It is not impossible that it should fall to the lot of this work, in 
its poverty and in the darkness of our time, that it should bring 
light into one brain or another, but it is not likely.
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Preface)
It is all one to me whether or not the typical western scientist 
understands or appreciates my work, since he will not in any 
case understand the spirit in which I write.
Wittgenstein, Culture and Value (p.7)
As argued earlier, NI simply does not make sense as 
an interpretation of WLP. Z608 makes far better sense 
when read against the background of many great literary 
works in which the imagery in Z608 is not employed 
in a scientific sense but, roughly, as it occurs in the 
great religious myths that form the basis of the Western 
intellectual tradition (See OC, 95). FAU explores the 
idea that salvation may arise from chaos and darkness of 
human life. PL argues that order and goodness arises from 
chaos in multiple senses, e.g., from Satan’s evil plans, 
from the swarming chaos of life, from Eve’s chaotic 
wandering, etc. In both FAU and PL it is only when one is 
centreed on the true centre that goodness and order can be 
made to arise out of the chaos/darkness (although Milton 
and Goethe have very different views of the precise nature 
of the true centre). Nevertheless, the same relationships 
found in Z608 are, with an important qualification, found 
in PL and FAU. 
The qualification is that there is nothing about God 
or spiritual centres in Z608. But LI does not hold that 
Wittgenstein endorses the theological views in PL or FAU. 
Z608 concerns the production of language. It no more 
states theological theories than scientific ones. In WRD 
Wittgenstein only says that he looks at philosophical 
problems from a religious point of view—not that he 
endorses any religious views (although he may do so 
independently).20 Wittgenstein employs religious imagery 
as useful similes for bringing “light” to the “darkness” 
of his time. Z608 poses the following challenge to the 
scientific paradigm, 
You modern scientists hold that language is produced by 
mechanisms at the neural centre, but there is an alternative 
paradigm. Why could not language arise on analogy with the 
way spiritual meaning is pictured as arising in literary works 
such as Faust and Paradise Lost? The picture in these works, 
tracing to ancient religious myths, is that human beings can 
make order arise out of the chaos of human life by finding the 
true spiritual centre. 
Wittgenstein claim is not that people can literally 
make language arise from chaos by moving towards 
some spiritual centre. It is that this creation imagery 
is a useful simile for breaking the grip of the dogmatic 
scientific picture and suggesting a new paradigm for our 
understanding of language.
Consider how differently LI would understand S1-S3 
from the way they are understood on NI, 
(S1) [I]f I talk or write, there is, I assume, a system of 
impulses going out from my brain and correlated with 
my spoken or written thoughts. (S2) But why should the 
system continue further in the direction of the centre? 
(S3) Why should this order not proceed, so to speak 
[sozusagen], out of chaos?
First, since S1 admits the existence of a neural system 
underlying language, NI, which holds that Z608 says 
that language may arise from neural chaos, simply must 
ignore S1. On LI, however, S1 makes perfect sense. Since 
LI holds that the centre and chaos are not the neural 
centre and neural chaos, it sees S1 simply as reminding the 
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reader that Wittgenstein’s method is neutral with regard 
to scientific theories. The mistaken belief that Z608 
denies standard scientific views about the neural basis for 
language arises only because, for reasons made familiar 
by Kuhn (1970), NI presupposes the very neuroscience 
paradigm that Z608 eschews. 
Second, whereas NI assumes that S2 asks why the 
system of neural impulses must continue towards the 
neural centre, LI holds that the whole point of Z608, 
read carefully, is that the true” language-generating 
centre is not the neural centre but the “Angelpunkt of our 
real need”—roughly, “forms of life.” Further, whereas 
NI sees the neural centre as the location of the neural 
mechanism that mechanically causes language production, 
Wittgenstein’s Angelpunkt of our real need is, rather, the 
kind of centre that one moves towards as to a goal. One 
does not often find references to this kind of centre-as-
goal in modern scientific texts (which have been largely 
purged of such teleological notions), but one does find it 
in many classic literary works. Since Goethe believes that 
one must move towards the single thought-centre in the 
world, S2 would, in his terms suggest, roughly: Why on 
earth would anyone think that a mere material system of 
nerve impulses gets one closer to the real creative centre 
where language arises? Similarly, since PL suggests that 
human beings must centre themselves on the Divine 
centre to make order arise in a chaotic world, S2, in 
Milton’s terms, would suggest, roughly: Why on earth 
would anyone think that one can make language arise by 
centring oneself on some mere material system of nerve 
impulses? 
Consider now a Goethean reading of S3. When 
Mephistopheles, that “son of chaos”, declares himself to 
be part of the darkness that “gave birth to light,” he is not 
suggesting that light may arise out of darkness or chaos 
in the brain, but that it may arise out of darkness or chaos 
of human life. Read in these Goethean terms, S3 suggests, 
once again, that human language may arise, sozusagen, 
from the chaos and darkness of human life. 
It may, however, be the reading of S3 in the light of 
Milton’s imagery that is most illuminating. Recall first 
that in PL goodness/order is implied to arise from the 
swarming chaos of the sons of Belial (which parallels the 
Goethean reading), but order is also implied to arise from 
Eve’s chaotic wandering through a dark world. Recall that 
Milton’s description of Eve’s wandering does not imply 
that it is literally chaotic. Eve may “wander” here because 
she sees some flowers, there because she follows a forest 
path, there because she hears some bird songs, etc. It is 
consistent with this that there is some unseen order to her 
wanderings. Eve’s chaotic wanderings are only sozusagen 
chaotic. They are chaotic from a certain point of view—
specifically, Adam’s point of view that she should remain 
under his “rational” control. For Eve does not wander 
with a particular rational goal in mind, e.g., she is not 
trying to calculate the surface area of Eden to determine 
how many parking lots it might accomodate. Eve explores, 
is adventurous, is open to what she may find in her 
wanderings, thereby disclosing new possibilities. Against 
this background, S3 suggests that language arises out of 
one’s wandering (journey) through the chaos and darkness 
of fallen life. Indeed, in PI (Preface) Wittgenstein uses 
precisely this imagery of wandering “criss-cross in every 
direction” over the “landscape” in order to bring “light” 
into the “darkness.”
Once one recognizes that Z608 is written in literary, 
not scientific, language, it becomes clear that it is not the 
odd singularity in WLP that some take it to be. In fact, 
several other passages in WLP make very similar points 
in different imagery: “Each of the sentences I write is 
trying to say … the same thing over and over again (CV, 7). 
Consider, for example, PI (635), where Wittgenstein asks 
what it is like to remember a past situation, 
It is as if a snapshot of a scene had been taken, but only a few 
scattered details of it were to be seen: here a hand, there a bit 
of a face, or a hat—the rest is dark. And now it is as if we knew 
quite certainly what the whole picture represented. [It is] as if I 
could read the darkness 
Given the connection between the images of chaos and 
darkness, PI (635) suggests that one’s memories arise, 
sozusagen, out of the chaos and darkness of one’s mental 
images. It is illuminating that “reading the darkness” is 
exactly what Adam and Eve must learn to do after the fall. 
Z608 and PI (635) make very similar points in slightly 
different imagery and neither of them has anything 
essential to do with theories about brain processes.
 Indeed, this literary reading sheds new light on 
Wittgenstein’s reference in PI (Preface) to the “poverty and 
darkness of our time.” Wittgenstein there mentions light 
in the brain, but no one (in their right mind) would take 
this as an allusion to neuroscience theories. Scholars have 
tended to see this passage as a vague personal reference 
to Wittgenstein’s distress at the impending war and at the 
superficial popular science of his cultureless age (Hallett, 
1974, p.66)—but, following WRD, it can be seen as the 
religious image of light entering a brain from above (not 
“arising” from the brain). A similar religious image occurs 
in Paradise Regained (Sims, 1979, pp.-22). Wittgenstein’s 
reference in PI (Preface) to the darkness is his way of 
indicating that he understands PI to be written from 
Samson’s position in Samson Agonistes (pp.98-100), where 
he has been “exiled from the light” and forced to live 
As in the land of darkness, yet in light, to live a life half dead, a 
living death, … 
Wittgenstein does, in fact, stress that death pervades man’s 
fallen life,
If in the midst of life we are in death, so in sanity we are 
surrounded by madness (RFM, IV.33).
The point in RFM (IV.33), paralleling that in Z608, 
is that mathematics too does not, sozusagen, fall from 
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heaven, but “arises” from the “death” and “madness” (the 
chaos and darkness) of man’s fallen life. The darkness in 
PI (Preface) and PI (635) and the death and madness of 
RFM (IV.33) are simply variations on the images of chaos 
and nothingness from Z6081. None of these passages have 
anything to do with scientific theories. In all these passages, 
Wittgenstein, following WRD, is indicating that his 
philosophy is, of course, written from the chaos/darkness 
of “our” fallen state. In the phenomenological terms of his 
Austrian forebears, Z608 is the description, not of the journey 
of neural impulses through the brain to the public world, but 
of journey from the chaos of life to meaningL in the shared 
“Life-world”—a “Life-world” that is, in Wittgenstein’s 
words, always right “in front of everyone’s eyes”.
6 .  “ VA I N  W I S D O M ”  A N D  “ FA L S E 
PHILOSOPHY” 
  [P]hilosophy really ought to be written only as a poetic 
composition.
Wittgenstein, Culture and Value (p.24)
Paradise Lost … deliberately stages the ancient battle between 
philosophy and poetry.
Kerrigan, “Milton’s Place in Intellectual History”2 (p.264)
Since it was his “obdurate pride” that caused Satan 
to be cast out of heaven (I: 36, 58) and Adam and Eve’s 
prideful desire to be “equal with gods” (IV: 526) that 
causes their fall from grace, one requires a more humble 
philosophy appropriate to man’s fallen nature. In order 
to illustrate this more humble conception of philosophy 
shared by Wittgenstein and Milton, recall, to take just 
one of many possible examples, the highly influential 
view of language-learning that Fodor (1979, 58) calls the 
Language of Thought Hypothesis (hereafter LOTH), 
If Chomsky is right … learning a first language involves 
constructing grammars consonant with some innate … system 
of language universals and testing [them] against … observed 
utterances [with the aid of] an innate simplicity metric. … 
[T]here must be a language in which [this knowledge] is 
represented … [and] it cannot be a natural language since, by 
hypothesis, it is his first language the child is learning.
Fodor (1987, x) finds it difficult to believe that 
anyone could disagree with LOTH because he sees 
“no alternative” to it, but he (1979, 65) admits it is 
philosophically problematic3.
1  Milton’s use of the notion of chaos in PL shares much with the 
ancient classical tradition in which chaos is closely connected with 
the chasm/abyss, the ocean, war, night/darkness, the boundless, 
indeterminacy, Satan, and the feminine, etc., (Osgood, 1964, pp.21-
22, 27, 60, 63; Johnson, 1989, p.73; Rumrich, 1996, pp.140-146; 
Rumrich, 2014; Teskey, 2006, Ch. 4). Teskey (2006, pp.65-66) notes 
important differences between the “objective” chaos in PL and the 
“subjective” chaos in Paradise Regained.
2  The original is from Plato’s Republic (607b5).
3  Fodor describes his view as “the only game in town” (Aydede, 
2010, § 8).
Part of what is problematic is that Fodor’s (1979, 65) 
view implies that “you can’t learn a language unless you 
already know one”. Fodor (1979, 82; 1987, 98-100, 111; 
etc.) escapes the prima facia infinite regress by positing 
that human beings come into the world possessed of an 
innate mental language called “Mentalese” that has to be 
“as powerful as any language [anyone] can ever learn”. 
Since Fodor’s new born human infants (hereafter FNI’s) 
can learn English, Spanish, Greek, Pashtun, Japanese, 
Cherokee, Malay, Yanomámi and all other possible natural 
languages, FNI’s are born already in possession of every 
concept that any human being could ever learn! Fodor 
(1979, 80) admits this is a “horrendous consequence” but 
it is only the beginning. FNI’s must also possess an “innate 
simplicity metric” and the scientific skill to “test” their 
innate grammars against the linguistic data they collect. It 
seems that FNI’s are born having already eaten, and eaten 
well, of the “tree of knowledge.”4
Adam and Eve’s state of innocence before the fall 
contrasts greatly with the sophisticated state of FNI’s5. 
Although FNI’s might stray into unfamiliar territory, there 
is no part of the world that is in principle dark to them. 
In this respect they contrast with Adam and Eve who are 
irrevocably surrounded by chaos and darkness (even if 
they do not always realize this). FNI’s may be in doubt 
whether this creature is an insect or an arachnid, but they 
are born in possession of all concepts needed to resolve 
all such questions. No part of the world can be irrevocably 
dark to them. Thus, just as Satan tempts Adam and Eve 
to desire a kind of knowledge that will make them “equal 
with Gods” (IV: 525-526), Fodor’s and Chomsky’s 
“cognitive science” tempts one with a vast knowledge of 
all possible human concepts of all possible understandable 
entities. FNI’s would seem, in that sense, to be “equal 
with gods”.
Fodor’s and Chomsky’s optimistic vision did not 
originate with them. It arose long ago in the rationalist 
tradition of Descartes (Chomsky, 2009), which, in turn, 
traces to Plato’s innatism (Fodor, 1983, 6; McDonough, 
1991). On the classical rationalist view, the world is made 
by God to be understood by the human mind which, 
similarly, is made by God to understand the world. But 
even if one believes in a divine creator, as does Milton, 
this does not mean one must believe that God must 
4  The Tree of Knowledge is often described as the tree of 
knowledge of good and evil, which might seem to include only 
moral knowledge. In fact, the Hebrew phrase is an example of 
merism in which opposite terms are combined to capture an entirety 
(Berlin, 2004, 2134), i.e., knowledge of good and evil is knowledge 
of the good and knowledge of the evil, i.e., knowledge of everything. 
5  One might think that Milton’s Adam and Eve are born with innate 
knowledge of language because they can speak immediately upon 
being created. However, Carrithers and Hardy (1994, 100-101, 144-
150) point out that for Milton “faith through grace can alone” make 
“knowledge real”. See also MacCallum (1986, 172-173). Adam 
and Eve are born speaking by means of God’s grace—not innate 
knowledge or neural mechanisms.
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construct the world after the rationalist blueprint. Milton’s 
God has more dramatic plans for man’s earthly journey 
towards salvation. The blueprint for Milton’s paradigm 
open existed in Hesiod’s view carried down through the 
ages in various forms that order need not arise out a prior 
order but may arise out of chaos.
Z608 attempts to revive a version of that ancient 
paradigm. Unfortunately, the defenders of the old 
paradigm tend to evaluate the challenger by reference 
to their own paradigm—resulting in the self-fulfilling 
prophecy that the upstart is absurd (Kuhn, 1970). Thus, 
NI reads Z608 in terms of the very neural paradigm that 
it eschews—resulting in the ascription to Z608 of the 
impossible (for a philosopher who says one must not 
advance any kind of theory) views that there may be 
sawdust, causal indeterminism, or connectionist neural 
processes in the brain. 
Significantly, WLP offers no formula for negotiating 
the chaos and darkness of man’s fallen life. In PI (Preface) 
Wittgenstein states that he can only offer portrait of his 
“long and involved journeyings … over a wide field 
of thought criss-cross in every direction”. Like Eve, 
Wittgenstein has done a great deal of wandering. Just as 
Eve’s sin began a journey in which she and Adam come 
to realize that their fallen state does not permit them to 
become “equal with gods,” so WLP takes philosophers on 
a journey in which they come to realize that their godlike 
concepts (of sublime mental languages, etc.) are “too high 
for man,”6
 [T]he form of expression we use seems to have been designed 
for a god, who knows what we cannot know … For us, of 
course, these forms of expression are like pontifical which we 
may put on, but cannot do much with, since we lack the effective 
power that would give [them] meaning and purpose. (PI, 426)
Milton, referring to certain fallen angels in hell (II: 
557-568), reflecting on the cause of their fall, makes a 
similar point about the limits of intellectualist philosophy,
Others sat apart on a hill retired,
in thoughts more elevate, and reasoned high
…
and found no end, in wandering mazes lost.
…
Vain wisdom all, and false philosophy!—
yet with pleasing sorcery, could charm
… and excite
Fallacious hope, …
Philosophy was supposed to lead one out of the chaos/
darkness. But by “reasoning too high” philosophers end up 
in a “vain wisdom” that “charms” with “pleasing sorcery” 
but gives only “fallacious hope” of godlike concepts that 
promise an escape from mankind’s fallen state7.
6  The expression is from Aristotle (1941, Bk X, 1177b26).
7  Durham and Pruitt. (2008), Mention Wittgenstein in this 
connection. The comparison between philosopher’s and fallen 
angels is too fascinating to pass over in silence (pp.106, 111-112).
Wittgenstein does not reject all philosophy. But his 
philosopher must “descend into primeval chaos and feel at 
home there” (CV, 65)—which is precisely what Adam and 
Eve had to do when they fell into the world of chaos and 
darkness and had to make a home there. Wittgenstein’s 
philosopher must, like Adam and Eve, descend into 
the chaos and darkness, wander through it “criss-cross 
in every direction” (PI, Preface), make a home in it, 
eventually recognize their human limitations and learn 
to read the chaos and darkness that had been there, right 
“in front of everyone’s eyes,” unseen, from the beginning 
(of the human world)8. The fundamental, but unspoken, 
moral of WLP is humility: “The edifice of your pride has 
to be dismantled. And that is terribly hard work” (CV, 26). 
The philosopher, who is constitutionally disposed to an 
exaggerated pride in his/her abilities, must recognize that 
reason is not given to humankind to plumb the secrets of 
the universe but to help them chart their way through the 
darkness of fallen life. Milton (Areopagitica, 252) agrees: 
“[R]eason is but choosing”9. 
Z608 is a paradigmatic example of Wittgenstein’s 
notion of philosophy as a “poetic composition.”10 As such, 
it is portrait, not of the journey of chemical impulses 
through the brain, but of man’s journey through the “mazy 
errors” of fallen existence towards the true “centre” of 
human life11. It is, perhaps, a measure of “the darkness of 
“our time” that one can see in Z608 an inconsistent (for 
Wittgenstein) excursus into armchair neuroscience. In fact, 
Z608 is a, roughly, a humble (therefore, metaphorical) 
description, sozusagen, of the genesis of the phenomenon 
of meaningL that is “already before one’s eyes” in the 
life-world of fallen humankind. Indeed, this is why an 
8  See Raine (2012, § 1). On the importance of the image of man’s 
true “home” in the Platonic philosophy and literature! 
9  Given Whitehead’s (1961). Distinction between the two 
fundamental conceptions of reason in the Western tradition, that 
deriving from Ulysses and oriented to the art of life, and that from 
Plato, oriented towards a godlike understanding of the cosmos, 
Milton’s conception of reason, like Wittgenstein’s, traces to Ulysses 
(Cf. Himes, 300 n 559, 314 n1020, 401 n122, pp.8-11).
10  Kerrigan’s (1989) remark that whereas “philosophy is “discourse 
with a limit … [p]oetry is chaos,” adds an intriguing dimension to 
the present discussion but cannot, unfortunately, be pursued here, 
(p.273).
11  Indeed, most commentators regard Wittgenstein’s 
comparison of language to a labyrinth (PI, 203) as a mere 
shorthand for the view that language is complicated, 
e.g., Black’s The Labyrinth of Language, named after 
Wittgenstein’s comparison of language to a labyrinth, 
never mentions the actual literary notion of a labyrinth. 
In fact, the labyrinth story involves precisely the same 
concepts mentioned in Z608. The labyrinth is itself a 
symbol of chaos (McCullough, 2005, 4, 45, 119, 220, 
222, etc.). The labyrinth has a centre that one must go 
towards in order to escape the labyrinth, i.e., the chaos 
(McCullough, 2005, 3, 6-10, 15-16, 18, etc.). The escape 
from the labyrinth symbolizes the arising, sozusagen, of 
a meaningful life, broadly speaking, from the chaos. But 
this lengthy story must, unfortunately, be left for another 
occasion.
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exegesis of the literary imagery that informs the “religious 
point of view” employed by Wittgenstein in writing Z608 
is so illuminating.
CONCLUSION 
The only way for us to guard our assertions against distortion 
– or to avoid vacuity in our assertions, is to have a clear view 
in our reflections of what the ideal is, namely an object of 
comparison – a yardstick, as it were – instead of making a 
prejudice of it to which everything has to conform. For this is 
what produces the dogmatism into which philosophy so easily 
falls.
Wittgenstein, Culture and Value (p.26)
The paper argues that the orthodox view that Z608 
suggests that meaningL and contentM may arise from 
neural processes is plainly untenable. WittgensteinL, who 
holds that one must “not advance any kind of theory” (PI, 
para. 108; Z, para. 233), cannot consistently be advancing 
neural theories in Z608. Rather, the key concepts in Z608 
must allude to phenomena that are “already in front of 
everyone’s eyes” (CV, p. 63), i.e., the concepts of chaos, 
the centre, the “arising” of order, etc., in Z608 must refer 
to aspects of forms of human life. The concepts in Z608 
have to be life-concepts rather than scientific concepts—
and, in fact, various versions of these life-concepts are 
shown to be present elsewhere in WittgensteinL’s works. 
Since such “life-concepts” are the natural province of 
literature, and since these concepts are found in Goethe 
and Milton, both of whom were admired by WittgensteinL, 
one can fashion an illuminating literary interpretation 
(LI) of Z608 that sheds new light both on Z608 and 
on WittgensteinL’s other works. LI illustrates why it 
makes sense that the motion of neural impulses in Z608 
is from the brain towards the true meaning-generating 
centre in public forms of human life. The production of 
meaningL and contentM is transferred from the domain 
of the scientific laboratory into the drama of human 
forms of life. Similarly, whereas NI’s view that meaningL 
and contentM arising out of chaos in the brain seems 
absurd and unscientific, LI’s idea that they arise out of 
the creative “chaos” of human forms of life is simply a 
reformulation, in new imagery, of the core perspective 
of WittgensteinL’s “life-philosophy.” By providing a new 
“yardstick” for evaluating meaningL and contentM, i.e., by 
employing non-theoretical literary language to compare 
their production to the genesis of a cosmos, LI discloses 
that the real point of Z608 is precisely opposite to that in 
NI: The aim of Z608 is to suggest a “Copernican” reversal 
of the received dogma about the true centre of meaningL 
and contentM. Z608 replaces NI’s idea that meaningL 
and contentM, “revolve,” sozusagen, around hidden 
mechanisms in the brain with the idea that they “revolve,” 
sozusagen, around forms of human life. But that is one of 
the central ideas of WittgensteinL’s works.
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